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 Although it ended only recently, Breaking Bad would seem already to be in the 
conversation concerning which television series is “the best show ever.” If a quick Google search 
of the terms “Breaking Bad” and “best show ever” that produces “about 59,800 results” is 
indicative of broad cultural trends, and what could be more reflective of our times and interests 
than a lazy Google search, Breaking Bad is at the very least, in Terry Malloy’s famous term, a 
contender. Of course, it goes without saying that discussions about the best show ever are good 
for little more than garnering revenue-generating clicks and giving graduate students something 
to argue about at pubs. As such this essay is not interested in whether Breaking Bad is “the best 
show ever,” even if the author tends to think it might well be. Instead, I want to begin with a 
heuristic consideration of that conversation before I look a bit more closely at what I call the 
aesthetic of brutality in Breaking Bad: its character, its most obvious precedent, and its 
implications. First though, what kinds of series tend to be included in the sweepstakes of “best 
show ever” and why? 
 Despite the implicit oxymoron, we are—accurately I think—said to be in the midst of a 
new or second golden age of television.1 And indeed there is a persuasive argument to be made 
that somewhere around the middle of the first decade after the turn of the millennium that series 
television has surpassed both the novel and the motion picture as the dominant form of narrative 
fiction. This new golden age is partly defined by the role of auteur-esque showrunners such as 
David Chase (The Sopranos), Jenji Kohan (Weeds and Orange is the New Black), Beau Willimon 
(House of Cards), David Simon (The Wire and Treme), Dan Harmon (Community), Mitchell 
Hurwtiz (Arrested Development), David Benioff (Game of Thrones), Matthew Weiner (Mad 
Men), and of course Vince Gilligan of Breaking Bad.  Although it is important to acknowledge 
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that the auteur theory has many problems both theoretical and practical, and that, as Michael 
Szalay reminds us, our present auteur showrunners like Weiner and Gilligan are “hardly the first 
to create, write for, and produce” their own series2, it seems clear that the relative carte blanche 
given to showrunners in the post-Sopranos era of subscription networks like HBO and 
Showtime, “mature themes” (i.e. sex, violence, and profanity), and limited or no commercial 
interruption have something to do with this “new” golden age (111). But of course, simply 
presenting “adult themes” uninterrupted by commercials does not make for a good television 
series (see Californication, Oz, Weeds, and Six Feet Under to name only a few). So what does 
make for a good, even great, show in the eyes of viewers and critics?  
Compelling plotlines, well-developed characters, strong acting, in some cases notable 
cinematography, assured filmmaking—all of these seem important, even if each is not 
necessarily crucial. But these factors must be insufficient for the simple reason that they are 
largely formal or technical. All of them then must be in service of a story, or stories, or even 
ideas that keep us watching. The shows should be about something. Perhaps the most illustrative 
examples of this credo, despite the fact that the two are very different series indeed, are The Wire 
and Community. While The Wire featured great storylines, indelible characters like Bubbles, 
Omar and Snoop, and thrilling action, what makes The Wire a candidate for “the best show ever” 
is clearly its central project—an almost Dickensian social realism that both reflects and critiques 
American “inner city” poverty, the so-called War on Drugs, and the structural racism that fuels 
both. It is in these senses that one can argue for The Wire’s candidacy as possibly the best artistic 
engagement with contemporary American social problems ever produced, and thus perhaps the 
best television series ever.3 Like The Wire, Community—despite not meriting mention in the 
“best ever” conversation—is about something. Both shows present the respective idiosyncratic 
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visions of their creators and both are “ideas” shows. One would have to stretch a bit to claim that 
the idea in Community has any social import. In fact, Community is about pop culture, and more 
particularly, like Seinfeld, it is about itself as a pop culture artifact. To say the show has no depth, 
only surfaces, is a misrepresentation of course. Instead, Harmon produces a heart on the sleeve 
parallel to Certeau’s consumer-actor model of culture in The Practice of Everyday Life. If one 
were unkind, one might say that Community is the perfect adequation of Generation X’s love of 
postmodern irony and popular culture fetishism with the deeply affective narcissism of so-called 
Millennials. Regardless, due to the fact that in being about itself Community can be said to be 
about something, to have the quality of aboutness at its core so to speak, it resembles The Wire 
and other prestige television series that are similarly centered on thematic matters— 
Mad Men, Deadwood, House of Cards to name only a few—although few are as single-mindedly 
about something as The Wire and Community are. It might appear then that having a solid 
thematic core, an aboutness as I have put it, should be added to the provisional list of criteria for 
“the best show ever” began above. There are two obvious exceptions to this criteria of aboutness 
though: the series that started the present golden age and the one that seems to have taken a 
common stylistic trait of the “great” shows, the antihero, to its extreme. I mean of course The 
Sopranos and Breaking Bad respectively.  
 The shows share more than just an anti-hero as protagonist. In fact, they are similar in 
that both could be said predicated on a “pitch.” It’s clear enough from watching the first season 
of The Sopranos what Chase’s pitch was: “Suburban family-man/mob lieutenant and tough guy 
suffers from anxiety and depression due in part to his overbearing mother and starts going to a 
psychiatrist as a result. The show plays out the tensions and juxtapositions of contemporary 
American life through violence, psychoanalysis, comedy, and sex.” Of course since Francis Ford 
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Coppola’s Godfather films, every film about organized crime is always already about capitalism, 
the American Dream, and family. So to say that The Sopranos is not about anything or that it 
developed entirely out of the two or three sentences of an imagined pitch is to vastly 
oversimplify. At the same time though, those thematic resonances are largely legitimacy-lending 
background material in The Sopranos rather than central issues. The greatness of the show comes 
down to its characters, its actors (especially Edie Falco as Carmella Soprano and the 
unfortunately deceased James Gandolfini as her husband Tony), and its near mastery of the 
dramatic tension produced by alternating between the figurative quietness of family life and the 
deafening loudness of violence and adulterous sex.  
 The pitch for Breaking Bad seems equally clear, perhaps even clearer: “Nice guy 
chemistry teacher is diagnosed with terminal cancer and ends up making meth with a loser 
former student in order to make enough money to take care of his family. Mayhem ensues.” 
Gilligan’s earlier work seems to reflect his debt to the logic of the pitch. Prior to becoming the 
showrunner of Breaking Bad, Gilligan worked extensively as a writer on The X-Files where he 
specialized in stand-alone episodes, often colloquially referred to as “Monster of the Week” 
(MOTW) episodes, that operated outside of the series’ larger conspiracy theory burdened story 
arc. These standalone episodes generally operate more as discomfiting horror stories than do the 
conspiracy episodes, which often foreground paranoia and suspense instead of horrific situations. 
Indeed Gilligan wrote some of the standout MOTW episodes of The X-Files—season three’s 
“The Pusher” (with future Breaking Bad star Bryan Cranston) and season four’s disturbing 
“Unruhe” and “Paper Hearts,” to name a few. Gilligan’s modus operandi then can be said to be 
that of the pitch. That is, the MOTW episodes of The X-Files are largely exercises in horror that 
almost like a Poe story take a single conceit to sometimes gruesome and often unflinching 
Final version 5 
extremes. That single conceit, what would be a gimmick in lesser hands, is the heart of the pitch. 
And on the whole, Gilligan’s pitches or conceits from his X-Files days are not particularly 
interested in larger thematic issues. If such themes do appear they are used, much as they are in 
The Sopranos, as background while the horrifying effect that really interests Gilligan is front and 
center. Understood a certain way then, and this is not at all a critique (precisely the opposite, in 
fact), Breaking Bad is not really “about” anything in the way that many of the other prestige 
programs mentioned above are. In fact if anything the show’s later attempts to embrace prestige 
television appropriate themes (e.g. capitalism and its effect on the so-called nuclear family) seem 
tacked on and unconvincing. Thematic concerns and thematic aboutness then are ultimately 
window-dressing in Breaking Bad, window-dressing that rarely if ever gets in the way of the 
effect of show. Like the aborted storyline concerning Marie Schrader’s (Betsy Brandt) penchant 
for shoplifting, the stabs at social commentary in Breaking Bad amount to filigree.  
At this point I should clarify what I mean when I say that Breaking Bad isn’t “about” 
anything. It might help to illustrate with a contrast. Famously, the seminal 1990s sitcom Seinfeld 
is by its own admission “a show about nothing.” And although that familiar saw is inaccurate in 
one sense—certainly Seinfeld is about the absurdity of sitcoms—it is accurate in another. That is, 
at its best Seinfeld reduces the tropes of the situation comedy to almost pure formalism. The 
laughs are produced for better or worse almost mechanically, and this fact serves to highlight the 
fundamental emptiness of sitcom tropes. So in Seinfeld, deeply cynical show that it is, we laugh 
at the very meaninglessness of sitcom “situations.” At the same time we laugh, subconsciously 
perhaps, at the very absurdity of our own laughter in the face of a maw of emptiness. This last 
laugh, if you will, is analogous to Samuel Beckett’s serio-comedy—the same laughter about 
which Nietzsche writes in a fragment collected in The Will to Power “Perhaps I know best why 
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man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was compelled to 
invent laughter” (74). On this reading, Seinfeld is at least partially about what existential 
philosopher Martin Heidegger called, most famously in the lectures that comprise Introduction to 
Metaphysics, “the Nothing.” As he puts it, the traditionally overlooked question of the Nothing, 
the question of why there are “beings at all instead of nothing,” is central to any philosophy of 
being, any ontology. In order to understand what is, Heidegger tells us, we must first start to 
think what isn’t. As a result of the question of the Nothing then, “[a]ll that is not Nothing comes 
into the question, and in the end [so does] even Nothing itself” (2). The point, ontological 
investigations and Heideggerian obscurity aside, is that Seinfeld is actually about “not nothing” 
precisely because it is about the Nothing(ness) of the sitcom. 
Breaking Bad is not like Seinfeld in this way then. The latter is about nothing, while the 
former is not about anything even when it pretends to be. Let us take an example: the character 
Saul Goodman (nee James McGill) played by Bob Odenkirk. Upon first being introduced to 
Saul, the viewer cannot be blamed for thinking that he is meant not just as a type—the sleazy 
lawyer—but that perhaps he, like the inflatable Statue of Liberty proudly displayed above his 
office, is a none-too-subtle jab at the absurd notion that American justice is blind. Saul first 
appears in the series when he interrupts the police interrogation of small-time dealer and Jesse 
Pinkman (Aaron Paul) associate Brandon “Badger” Mayhew (Matt L. Jones) in episode eight of 
season two. Odenkirk plays Goodman as the ultimate ambulance chasing slickster, and the scene 
ends predictably with a humorous discussion of pecuniary matters; Saul is catholic as far as 
payment goes, but he does not take American Express.5 It is true enough that as time goes on 
Saul becomes a major character and his role becomes more and more clearly defined, moving 
him away from his almost allegorical flatness. But counterintuitively, Saul actually becomes less 
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compelling as his character develops and he becomes comic relief. Despite his centrality to the 
show, and despite Odenkirk’s excellent and against type performance, the audience soon realizes 
that Saul isn’t a satire of American justice, nor is he commentary on our increasingly litigious 
tendencies in the United States. Instead, like the conventional characters of the medieval mystery 
play, Saul serves a formal purpose and not a thematic one. Saul is, and this is metonymic for the 
logic of Breaking Bad, about effect—here both relief and heightening of tension—and not about 
meaning or content, satirical or otherwise.  
Like Saul’s character then, at its best Breaking Bad is not about nothing, rather it is not 
about anything; the latter being very different indeed from the former. To not be about anything 
though means to be lacking in a central way what I have infelicitously called aboutness.  
But even if the show isn’t about anything, it’s far from pointless. In fact its center is what 
Aristotle called in the Poetics a dynamis, a word S.H. Butcher and Lane Cooper translate with 
the phrase “essential quality.”7 In the Poetics that dynamis, that essential quality, can be 
understood as what Andrzej Warminski terms poetry’s “power, faculty, capacity, ability, to do 
something” (202). Breaking Bad wants to do something then, even at the very moment that it is 
not about anything, and it is this doing to which I will now turn. Think of the most indelible 
scenes in Breaking Bad: of Jesse and Walt attempting to dissolve the body of Emilio (John 
Koyama) and of Walt strangling Domingo Molina aka “Krazy-8” (Max Arciniega) early in 
season one. Think of Tuco’s (Raymond Cruz) and Hank Schrader’s (Dean Norris) respective 
beatings of Jesse Pinkman, of Walt’s murder of Jesse’s girlfriend Jane (Krysten Ritter), and 
maybe most of all think of the season five murders of Hank and of Brock’s mother and Jesse’s 
ex, Andrea Cantillo (Emily Rios), and of relative newcomer Todd Alquist’s (Jesse Plemons) 
heartless execution of a little boy on a dirt bike.  
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These scenes and others like them indicate the core of Breaking Bad: watching it is, at the 
show’s best, almost unbearably intense. This is because very much like the second scene in 
Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West in which another child is killed, rather than supplying 
relief to the viewer by resolving tense or possibly disastrous situations, Breaking Bad more often 
than not takes the audience to—and sometimes even just past—the limits of bearability. No 
doubt many viewers of Breaking Bad have had the same reactions that we had in my 
household—that of an taking a temporary viewing hiatus to take a break from the intensity 
and/or of vowing not to watch Breaking Bad before bed because of the dreams it caused! And in 
fact in the wake of the series’ success New Yorker television critic Emily Nussbaum goes so far 
as to suggest that “good television” has with its focus on intensity and violence become like, 
quoting a tweet from Time’s James Poniewozik, “a chile pepper-eating contest.” This 
characterization points to the show’s great strength and its essential quality or dynamis: its 
intensity, or more properly it is its ability to produce an experience of intensity in the audience. 
As I have argued, it is incorrect to say that the show is about intensity, of course. At the same 
time, it does exist primarily to produce an experience of emotional, even visceral, intensity in its 
audience—a goal at which it succeeds almost too well sometimes. In what follows then I am 
interested in that experience of intensity, in its character, how it works, and in what an analysis 
of it might have to say on theories of experience per se.  
The word I have use so far to describe this essential quality, “intensity,” is insufficient, 
though, because it fails to fully account for the experience in question. The quality of intensity 
can be ascribed to any number of perceptions and qualities, from sweetness and ecstasy to pain 
and smell. Since my present goal is to be precise about the essential quality of Gilligan’s show, 
we have need of another word. I propose then that the essential quality, the dynamis, of Breaking 
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Bad can be said to be the show’s ability to produce the experience of an aesthetic response I will 
call brutality. Indeed, the essential quality of Breaking Bad is the production of the experience of 
brutality in the same way that Aristotle famously argues that the dynamis of Attic tragedy is the 
production of catharsis. And in fact we should be precise when we refer to catharsis in tragedy. It 
would be incoherent to say simply that the essential quality of tragedy is catharsis because 
catharsis is not inherent to the tragic play itself. Rather, catharsis comes about in the affective 
reaction a given tragic play produces in an audience. It is in this sense that we would be advised 
to speak of an experience of catharsis when we speak of the dynamis of tragedy, rather than 
simply catharsis. In a similar manner, when we speak of the dynamis of Breaking Bad, we must 
also speak of an experience of brutality, not simply of brutality. And this in turn means that the 
essential quality of the show, as is the case with tragedy, is aesthetic all the way down. This is for 
the simple reason that its production of experience necessitates an audience. And we when speak 
of an audience, as opposed to spectators for example, we imply just this kind of dialectical 
relation between the aesthetic object and the aesthetically attuned, receptive viewer. So while the 
term aesthetic is conventionally understood to involve sensuous perception and/or matters of 
taste, I mean it here in a broader, but simultaneously more restricted, sense. The aesthetic object 
by definition requires an audience precisely because it cannot perform its dynamis without one. 
So we can refer to an object as aesthetic in the present sense if it is composed and produced in 
order to achieve some effect or experience in an audience.8 We can in turn refer to an experience 
as aesthetic if it A) takes an aesthetic object as its focus and B) through interpretation or reaction 
from an aesthetically attuned audience produces an affective or intellectual response.  
I have already argued the rather uncontroversial point that Breaking Bad operates on a 
logic of intensity, and as I have just noted that this logic is in an essential way an aesthetic one. 
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But our task here is to bring matters to a finer point, the point of brutality. In order to do so, it 
will benefit us to take a closer look more closely at this logic. One of Breaking Bad’s greatest 
tricks is its ability to top itself by relentlessly intensifying scenes and situations that were already 
cringe inducing. Some of this aptitude results from the show’s willingness to portray intense and 
sudden acts of violence, of course. Those acts are sometimes so gruesome in their depiction, 
consequences, or execution (suggested or otherwise) that they produce in the audience a very 
literally visceral response. But it is not violence that makes the show. As we know, overreliance 
on violence, even sudden and gruesome violence, will have a numbing effect on the audience 
over time, a fatigue that Breaking Bad deftly avoids. And in fact some of the most intense 
scenarios in Breaking Bad are not at all gruesome: the murder of Andrea is not, in fact it is 
almost clinically clean. And who can forget the tableside guacamole scene from season five’s 
“Confessions?” Intense yes, violent no. More importantly, perhaps the most discomfiting aspect 
of the entire show is Walt’s sociopathic manipulation of the emotionally broken Jesse Pinkman 
over its course; a manipulation that is psychically but not usually physically violent. In fact, the 
“relationship” between Walt and Jesse serves as an illustrative analogy of how the show’s 
intensity operates in that their relationship is a series-long red herring. Because Walt comes off at 
times as, if not sympathetic, at least masterful, and because unlike Walt, Jesse seems to have 
some kind of a moral compass, the audience persists in hoping that Walt has some true affection 
for Jesse. Until the very last, we hope against all hope that Walt will, if not feel regret for his 
horrific actions, at least gain some perspective on his mistreatment of Jesse.  
The closing scene of the series finale puts that entirely foolish hope to bed once and for 
all of course Because it seems to offer Walt self-justification as he smiles as on his deathbed, the 
finale essentially forces the audience into the uncomfortable position of being what Nussbaum 
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has called the “bad fan.”9 Like the generation of fans who see the title character of Brian De 
Palma’s Scarface as a hero, a reading that the film does somewhat ambiguously sanction, if the 
viewer of Breaking Bad has been even partly in Walt’s corner she must confront her own status 
as a bad fan, or at least a fan who is in bad faith. Animating this effect is a complex mix of 
generic expectations and canny filmmaking. Because the show, especially early on, stresses 
Walt’s family life, and because we expect against all evidence that the Walt/Jesse relationship 
will blossom into a standard television ersatz father/son relationship for the simple reason that 
this always happens in television series, we are able to largely suspend our moral judgments of 
Walt. The show’s depiction of the Whites’ white (no coincidence that), suburban, middle-class 
family life operates in the same manner; it lures us into thinking that perhaps everyone will live 
happily ever after. After all, families always live happily ever after on TV, unless there is social 
critique (The Wire), unrelenting miserablism (House of Cards), or nihilism (House of Cards 
again) in a given show’s DNA. This same effect is achieved by Breaking Bad’s tendency to flirt 
with outright, if never truly lighthearted, comedy. In fact, paradoxically the show’s erratic mood 
swings between the comedic—think of Saul Goodman again—and the awful do not serve so 
much to lighten the mood but as a form of contrast that makes the show’s darkness all the darker.  
But, and this is a crucial distinction, even as the comedic aspects of the show highlight 
the intensity of its darkness Breaking Bad never completely alienates its audience with that 
darkness. Part of the reason for this is that Breaking Bad self-consciously rejects of the kind 
realism found in The Wire. With its evil fried chicken/drug kingpin, its twin assassins, its often-
surreal cinematography, that is the world of Breaking Bad is very self-consciously that of a 
television program. And that world is only tangentially related to the audience’s experienced 
reality—at least outside of the show’s portrayal of the domestic sphere. And while much of the 
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show’s drama springs from that sphere, it is the precisely because the filmmakers do such a 
persuasive job of bracketing the rest of the show’s world from “real life” that the audience 
accepts its grotesque extremes. The audience then is a willing, even active, partner to the show’s 
grueling intensity. We are energized in a strange way by our anticipation of the next and likely 
even more horrific moment precisely because we at a safe distance from our experienced reality, 
a fact that the show marks in its stylistic bombast.  
 I have already noted that one way that Breaking Bad is able to produce this experience of 
brutality is that it self-consciously distances its world from the real world through comedy, 
caricature, and a self-awareness concerning the tropes of American television and their audience 
effects. In short, because of this self-conscious distancing or bracketing—this aestheticizing— of 
the lived world, the audience is less likely to perceive the horrific moments of the show as purely 
sadistic cruelty. So the horrific moments in Breaking Bad retain their power to shock and even 
titillate, never becoming tiresome or more importantly unwatchable. And in fact they also 
become de rigeur, precisely that which keeps the audience watching. We know what it is 
coming, or we think we do, after watching a season or so of Breaking Bad: inevitably it is 
something terrible. Of course, when that something terrible doesn’t come in a given episode, we 
can feel relieved. But whether or not we are willing to admit it, we are disappointed as well. We 
wanted that awfulness, perhaps even desperately. Indeed, we crave it. We look forward to the 
next shock; indeed this is why we watch. We know nothing good will happen and we are 
perversely reassured by this knowledge. We have broken bad along with Walter White. Because 
of this fact, whether or not we cheer for Walter—whether or not we become “bad fans”—is not 
an important. By simply watching the show, we are fully complicit in its gleeful nihilism.  
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The experience of watching Breaking Bad can be summed up then as looking forward to 
the ever upping ante of awfulness, an experience that only intensifies as we become further 
accustomed to the show’s brutal logic. In short, to the extent that we buy into Breaking Bad, we 
become connoisseurs of the horrific, the brutal. And ultimately it is this ambivalent enjoyment of 
the horrific that defines the experience of brutality. Of course that experience is one of intensity, 
even almost unbearable intensity, but that intensity is predicated on a special, if not unique as I 
shall argue in a moment, two factors. The first is the almost unbearable awfulness, but the second 
is the position of safety occupied by the viewer in regards to that awfulness. It is aesthetic 
distance that allows for such safety of course. We are, as Kant famously said, interested but 
simultaneously disinterested. We are safe from moral claims because, after all, it’s just a TV 
show. This point should come as no surprise. Visceral entertainment like roller coasters and 
horror films often allow us to experience something that under other circumstances would be 
traumatic. The psychological safety of the experience of brutality is not, then, a defining point. 
What is a defining point of this experience is that, in addition to giving the audience a thrill by 
presenting horrific acts and scenes in a safe manner, it trains us, in an important way, to savor 
those horrific moments—the very ones from which we initially turned away, literally or 
figuratively. Unlike a roller coaster ride though, in the experience of brutality the audience is not 
simply excited by a thrilling or even terrifying experience. Instead she derives pleasure from her 
complicity, willing or otherwise, in utterly morally reprehensible figured acts of cruelty and 
murder. That pleasure is no doubt in part produced by the viewer’s own repressed cruelty. At the 
same time though, and more importantly, it is animated by a feeling of consequence-free moral 
transgression that results from the viewer’s awareness of her complicity in the show’s brutality. 
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Breaking Bad is unique in prestige television not only because of its relentless focus on 
the experience of brutality, a focus I have argued is its essential quality, but because it was 
incredibly successful critically and commercially by dint of that focus. If it is correct to say its 
dynamis is the production of that experience, Breaking Bad’s popular and critical success must 
be understood as a widespread initiation into the phenomenon of this experience. And this is 
unprecedented in mainstream entertainment. Certainly Gilligan’s work on The X Files 
intermittently revels in its brutality, as do certain episodes of new golden age series, e.g. Six Feet 
Under’s infamous “That’s My Dog” and “Kennedy and Heidi” in the final season of The 
Sopranos. These are isolated episodes though, and precisely because they are isolated they 
cannot be said to represent a wider engagement with an ethos of brutality. But is the focus on 
brutality in Breaking Bad completely sui generis? I argue no. In fact, prior to the success of 
Breaking Bad this experience of brutality can be found in another, significantly less mainstream, 
genre: death metal.  
Death metal of course is a kind of rock music, and more specifically it is a species of the 
genre of rock music called heavy metal. Heavy metal is a relatively recent genre, having come 
into its own only in the mid-1970s. The term heavy metal, despite its somewhat mysterious 
origin, is particularly apt for this genre due to the so-called heaviness of the music itself, 
heaviness that manifests particularly in the use of distorted, sometimes detuned, guitars playing 
so-called power chords, chords that are often dissonant or unsettling. Thundering drums and 
screaming or guttural vocals contribute to this atmosphere of “heaviness.” The roots of heavy 
metal can be found largely in British Invasion blues-rock and psychedelia turned up, as it were, 
to eleven. Commonly cited progenitors are the Jimi Hendrix Experience, the Jeff Beck Group, 
Blue Cheer, Vanilla Fudge, Iron Butterfly, and especially Deep Purple, Led Zeppelin, and most 
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importantly Birmingham, England’s Black Sabbath. While heavy, riff-based rock music existed 
well before Black Sabbath’s 1970’s eponymous debut album, that record—packed with tritones, 
piercing vocals, lumbering tempos, evocations of the occult and a truly Manichean worldview—
codified heavy metal’s darker aspect. The influence of Black Sabbath on heavy metal cannot be 
overstated. Indeed, many of the seemingly inexhaustible subgenres of heavy metal derive either 
direct or indirect inspiration from Black Sabbath. The most obvious example would be what is 
called “doom metal,” a subgenre that takes the slow, heavy, mournful aspects of Black Sabbath’s 
early work to the extreme. Doom metal is typically considered to be a kind of “extreme metal,” a 
grouping of subgenres of heavy metal that encompasses its less mainstream, and less accessible, 
permutations. Sociologist Keith Kahn-Harris argues that the main genres of extreme metal can be 
understood to be doom metal, thrash metal, grindcore, black metal and, of course, death metal (4-
5).10 As Kahn-Harris argues it, death metal springs from thrash metal in the mid 1980s.11 This 
darkness, in lyrical content, in album art, and of course in the music itself, is Black Sabbath’s 
most obvious legacy to death metal. That is, just as doom metal took Black Sabbath’s sound to 
the extreme, death metal takes the band’s fascination with evil and darkness to the extreme by 
simultaneously distancing the music itself from its roots in the blues and by introducing a very 
1980s interest in “body horror,” serial killers, and so-called slasher films. But because, as Kahn-
Harris also notes, in death metal the vocals become almost indecipherable, the genre’s 
fascination with all things horrific is conveyed not through lyrics as a medium of understanding 
but rather through song titles, album art, and the distorted “death grunt” (or growl) style of 
singing pioneered by Jeff Becerra of Possessed, Kam Lee and Chuck Schuldiner of 
Mantas/Death, and Tom G. Warrior of Hellhammer and later Celtic Frost. I note these 
identifying characteristics because one result of what appears to be the endless subcategorization 
Final version 16 
of heavy metal genres is that question of how to place a given group becomes a topic of much 
debate. And this question in turn comes down to the question of what makes something death 
metal? Certainly when a listener with some experience hears bands like Cannibal Corpse, 
Suffocation, Death, Morbid Angel, Nile, Cryptopsy, early Opeth, Entombed, and Carcass, or 
even sees their album covers, she can fairly easily identify them as death metal due to their 
heaviness and detuned guitars, their subject matter, and their vocals. But ultimately the essential 
quality of death metal, its dynamis, is the same of as that of Breaking Bad—the production of the 
experience of brutality.  
This experience of brutality in death metal then should be able to be mapped onto 
Breaking Bad, and in fact it can. In death metal, brutality is not simply about violent imagery in 
lyrics or on album covers, just as Breaking Bad does not derive its aesthetic effect through 
graphic violence alone. In fact, both lyrics and album art are paratextual in death metal, which 
means that although they can certainly contribute to brutality they are not essential to it. By way 
of illustration, an Amy Grant record with a Cannibal Corpse cover is not brutal, nor is the 
melody to “When I’m Sixty Four” paired with the lyrics to Morbid Angel’s “Immortal Rites.” 
Brutality resides in the music itself, then. But it is not reducible to a certain formula of chords, 
notes, time signatures, instruments, a style of singing, or distorted amplification, even if it relies 
on each of those to a greater or lesser degree. For example, of the so-called Big Four of thrash 
metal, Metallica, Megadeth, Anthrax, Slayer, all of which use essentially the same sonic palette, 
only Slayer is brutal. So if brutality isn’t about imagery, or even about a specific sound, what is it 
about?  
Brutality in death metal refers to an experience the initiate or fan has when listening. That 
experience is oppressive, gut wrenching, and exhausting. One is happy in a strange way when the 
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album, or even the song, is over. The listener has been through a difficult journey, she has been 
sonically abused, and there is palpable relief when it stops. So far this should sound familiar to 
us from our discussion of the experience of brutality in Breaking Bad. But if these things were 
sufficient to explain brutality in death metal, the genre would be little more than an exercise in 
masochism. While that may be partly the case, it would be difficult to imagine that a musical 
genre would prosper over roughly thirty years if all it had to offer were aural self-flagellation. 
The question then would be whether death metal like Breaking Bad offers the excitement of 
anticipation of the awfulness to come, a peculiar savoring of the horrifying, and a satisfaction, 
even pleasure, that results from depictions that would normally be considered nihilistic and 
immoral at best, and truly repugnant and evil at worst?    
 The short answer is yes, and this is in fact what indicates to us that death metal shares its 
essential quality with Breaking Bad. Indeed, the defining factor of death metal, the one thing 
death metal must have is brutality. And in fact when I use the term brutality to talk about 
Breaking Bad I am borrowing the term, which serves both a descriptive and normative purpose, 
from fan characterization of death metal. Death metal is by definition brutal in the ways that I 
have outlined so far. That brutality, which is a shorthand way of talking about the genre’s central 
goal of producing the experience of brutality in the listener, results from a concatenation of 
themes, song titles, album art, and the music itself, but it cannot be reduced to these for the 
simple reason that they must be understood to be in service of the two goals I have already 
gestured at: first, the inaccessibility for the uninitiated and second, the peculiar blend of pain and 
pleasure that is the experience of brutality. To the experienced listener, to the fan, the best death 
metal is the most brutal death metal. And as we saw above with Breaking Bad, that brutality is 
fundamentally pleasurable for her.  
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But this is only true for the initiate, and here is where we can see a central difference 
between death metal and Breaking Bad. That is, for the uninitiated listener death metal played at 
loud enough volumes may produce physical pain and even disorientation. It will certainly not 
produce pleasure. A death metal aficionado though will have a much richer experience. She 
won’t experience just the painful aspects, although she will experience them.12 For the fan, the 
negativity brutality in death metal is tempered with a strange kind enjoyment. That enjoyment 
stems in part from familiarity, of course. A person who has never really listened to death metal 
will be likely be taken aback by it, while a familiarized listener will know what to expect by and 
large. But familiarity is not the only factor, and it is certainly the case that one can become 
familiar with death metal without ever coming to enjoy it. The unpleasantness may diminish over 
time, of course, but the non-fan will never have the full experience of brutality because he or she 
will miss out on this pleasure. Indeed, many partners of death metal fans have firsthand 
knowledge of this phenomenon.  
One must be fully initiated in order to truly experience death metal’s aesthetic of brutality 
and to be initiated is to overcome or bracket what we generally find pleasurable in popular 
music: melody, harmony, depictions of interpersonal relationships. And indeed, death metal 
prides itself on being inaccessible to the casual listener. And in fact the stylistic markers noted 
above—manic blast beat drumming, guttural and indecipherable vocals, oppressive heaviness, a 
fixation on violence and death—are in service of this inaccessibility. But as stylistic gatekeepers, 
they articulate an inclusivity that draws the line between initiate and non-initiate. More 
importantly, they also provide the grist for the pleasure, the deliciousness, of the experience 
brutality in death metal. Once she has learned the ins and outs of the genre, as it were, she 
becomes increasingly able to see past its alienating qualities, while still feeling their negative 
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effects, and becomes aware that those qualities themselves are constitutive of the pleasure 
generated by the music. That pleasure is a pleasure in ugliness, to be sure, a suffocating, 
discomfiting pleasure that can only be described at the same time as delicious. That 
deliciousness, so central to the experience of brutality, is derived less from the depiction of an 
individual’s repressed tendencies toward violence and cruelty than from her ability to navigate 
depictions cruelty and violence safely and pleasurably through generic tropes. This kind of 
navigation can be illustrated with a quick glance at Jonathan Demme’s acclaimed 1991 thriller 
The Silence of the Lambs. We are likely to be horrified watching the serial killer “Buffalo Bill” 
(Ted Levine) torment his victim, the abject Catherine Martin (Brooke Smith). As depictions of 
sheer sadism, these scenes will be deeply troubling to most viewers. On the other hand, we are 
fascinated by Hannibal Lecter (Anthony Hopkins) who is also, of course, a serial killer. Lecter is 
different though because we do not perceive him as a true sadist. Lecter is instead a connoisseur 
of experience, a player of games, a person with what can only be called, despite the pun, taste. In 
fact this kind of taste, this finely tuned “aesthetic” would appear to mirror one of the essential 
aspects of the experience of brutality: the ability to take aesthetic pleasure in what appears at first 
to be entirely horrific. 
Breaking Bad then brings to the masses an experience previously found in the marginal 
or underground genre of rock music called death metal. I won’t go as far as to say that Gilligan’s 
series takes inspiration directly from death metal, but I do want to argue that the best way to 
understand the essence of Breaking Bad and the irrelevance of questions regarding the show’s 
aboutness is to see them in terms of the experience that death metal provides to its fans. There 
are of course some crucial differences between the two, the most of important of which is the 
very ability of Breaking Bad to appeal to a wide public, something death metal prides itself in 
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not doing. Precisely because Breaking Bad craftily uses and repurposes all too familiar tropes 
derived from decades of American television rather than organizing itself against the familiar as 
death metal does, because Breaking Bad appears to play by the rules that is, it attracts a wider 
audience rather than winnowing it down. Breaking Bad’s true uniqueness then can be understood 
as its ability to produce the experience of brutality found in death metal but to a general 
audience. Breaking Bad has no use for death metal’s rigorous disciplinary policing, 
demonstrating instead that firstly, such policing is not an inherent part of the experience of 
brutality, and secondly that an aesthetic experience assumed to have only limited appeal, perhaps 
only to certain subcultural “sickos,” is perfectly capable of enthralling the water-cooler crowd.  
If what I have claimed so far about Breaking Bad is true, a fair response might be that 
even if at its center Breaking Bad seeks to reproduce the essential quality of death metal, that is 
the experience of brutality, isn’t this just counting angels on the head of a pin? While I think it is 
useful to understand the three main related points I have addressed thus far—that Breaking Bad 
isn’t about anything, that its dynamis is the production of the aesthetic experience of brutality, 
that this dynamis can also be found in death metal in more limited form—if only so that we may 
most accurately characterize the show, I want to push the matter just a bit further by addressing 
two final questions. Those questions are as follows: What does it mean to have an experience in 
the sense I have been discussing here? And what, if anything, can the experience of brutality tell 
us about experience as such? 
Allow me then to close by looking at the other key term, experience—a task I undertake 
with the help of two major figures of twentieth century continental philosophy: the thinker, 
essayist, and cultural critic Walter Benjamin and the hermeneutic philosopher Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Although both German and born only eight years apart, Benjamin and Gadamer have 
Final version 21 
roots in very different intellectual traditions. Benjamin’s thought draws from many schools 
including both philosophical and cultural Marxism, sociology, literary theory, mystical Judaism, 
and psychoanalysis among others. Benjamin was a powerfully original thinker who had a 
complicated relation to Marxism, but it is not incorrect to note that his project lines up fairly well 
with the cornerstones of Frankfurt School Critical Theory—a dialectical and skeptical 
examination of culture and society that is defined by, as Martin Jay puts it in The Dialectical 
Imagination, its “aversion to closed philosophical systems” (41). Gadamer, on the other hand, 
although equally and essentially interested in culture and its interpretation, was a student of 
Heidegger’s—a thinker who the Frankfurt School’s de facto leader Theodor Adorno despised. 
Gadamer draws from the phenomenological tradition, from German Existenz philosophy, from 
Aristotle, and particularly from Hegel. Despite their many differences, differences that are far too 
numerous and complex to discuss here, both attend to what might glibly be called the uses and 
abuses of culture. In doing so both discuss experience as it relates to culture, which is to say 
aesthetic experience. The lens they use to do so is provided by nineteenth century German 
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, one that results from the distinction implied in the two different 
German words for experience: Erfahrung and Erlebnis.13 Prior to Dilthey’s work, the standard 
German word for experience was Erfahrung. Under the influence of the Kantian distinction 
between the world as such and our perception of the world as well as the romantic tendency to 
focus on experience, Dilthey argued, we ought to understand the phenomenon of lived 
experience as Erlebnis, with its etymological derivation from the German leben, to live, rather 
than Erfahrung which he argued had to do with perception and cognitive judgment and not with 
what we might call the actuality of lived experience. Put too simply, for Dilthey Erlebnis is a 
comprehensive understanding of experience that takes into account what later thinkers 
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influenced by him would call the Lebenswelt or “lifeworld.”14 Broadly speaking then for Dilthey 
experience as Erlebnis takes into account the lifeworld of a person, cultural and even individual, 
in a way that an empirical and perhaps even mechanistic Erfahrung does not. 
This distinction between the attenuated notion of experience as Erfahrung and experience 
that exists within social and psychological context, i.e. Erlebnis, becomes an important one for 
both Walter Benjamin and Gadamer. Benjamin discusses Erfahrung and Erlebnis most directly 
in the long essay called “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” originally published in 1939. In that 
essay he questions the relevance of lyric poetry in modernity by writing that “[i]f conditions for a 
positive reception of lyric poetry have become less favorable, it is reasonable to assume that only 
in rare instances is lyric poetry in rapport with the experience of its readers. This may be due to a 
change in the structure of their experience” (156).15 If a long excerpt can be excused, Benjamin 
addresses the difference between Erlebnis and Erfahrung in Les Fleur du mal in Section IV of 
that essay as follows 
The greater the shock factor [Anteil des Chockmoments] in particular impressions, the 
more vigilant consciousness has to be in screening stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, 
the less these impressions enter long experience (Erfahrung) and the more they 
correspond to the concept of isolated experience (Erlebnis). Perhaps the special 
achievement of shock defense is the way it assigns an incident a precise point in time in 
consciousness, at the cost of the integrity of the incident’s contents. This would be a peak 
achievement of the intellect; it would turn the incident into an isolated experience. 
Without reflection, there would be nothing but the sudden start. (163, emphasis added) 
Here we can see that the usefulness of the distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis is that for 
Benjamin, Erfahrung (“long experience”) is the pre-modern, pre-urban understanding of 
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experience.  In this way, Benjamin’s view of Erfahrung differs from Dilthey’s, even though they 
agree that the two are distinct types of experiences. For Benjamin, Erfahrung contains within it 
historicity and a certain kind of “content,” a meaning that is if not objective at least not 
privatively subjective. Benjamin’s Erlebnis, on the other hand, is exactly this—privatively 
subjective. A useful comparison might be Benjamin’s well-known conception of the “aura” from 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” The argument made in that essay is 
that prior to modernity, the unique art object had an aura that inhered in it: a locus of history and 
tradition.16 In the age of mechanical reproduction, Benjamin argues that aura is lost and replaced 
by what he calls in the excerpt above “shock” (Chock). Shock is an ahistorical, privative, and 
purely subjective kind of experience. Ultimately, Benjamin argues that in Les Fleurs du mal 
Baudelaire “give[s] the weight of an experience (Erfahrung)” to “something lived through 
(Erlebnis)” (194). Like the aura of the work of art, Benjamin implies, in capitalist, urban 
modernity experience as Erfahrung has been replaced by experience understood as Erlebnis, as 
subjective, psychic, and ahistorical: experience (Erlebnis) as shock (Chock). 
 Gadamer too is concerned with Dilthey’s distinction. In his 1960 magnum opus Truth 
and Method, Gadamer in essence concurs with Benjamin regarding Erfahrung and Erlebnis. But 
while for Benjamin the loss of experience understood as Erfahrung in modernity has ambiguous 
normative repercussions, for Gadamer it is a symptom of a highly problematic subjectivism—a 
subjectivism that Gadamer, like his teacher Heidegger, vigorously critiques. Gadamer illustrates 
this in Part 1 of Truth and Method, called in English “The Question of Truth as it Emerges in the 
Experience of Art,” and which contains a careful examination of art and its reception in 
modernity. In fact, a portion of this first part of Truth and Method is called “The Aesthetics of 
Genius and the Concept of Experience (Erlebnis).” Here Gadamer attacks neo-Kantian 
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aesthetics, writing that “Kant’s doctrine of the ‘heightening of the feeling of life’ (Lebensgefühl) 
in aesthetic pleasure helped the idea of ‘genius’ to develop into a comprehensive concept of life 
(Leben)… Hence, by trying to derive all objective validity from transcendental subjectivity, neo-
Kantianism declared the concept of Erlebnis to be the very stuff of consciousness” (52). For 
Gadamer then, who proceeds to offer a philosophic etymology of the word Erlebnis, experience 
as Erlebnis can be said to be the experience of art that stems from modern post-Kantian 
subjectivity. It is therefore a degraded notion of experience; one that understands personal 
experience as “material to be shaped,” as “immediacy, which precedes all interpretation, 
reworking, and communication” (53). This understanding in turn produces an artificial 
“alienation” from “history,” just as we saw in Benjamin, (56) and in doing so also alienates us 
from tradition as well as what Gadamer calls “prejudice” (Vorurteil).17 All of this is of course in 
contrast to the pre-modern understanding of “historically effected consciousness” which has “the 
structure of experience (Erfahrung)” (341) and in which “the spiritual creations of the past, art 
and history” (56) were clearly articulated with history, tradition, and prejudice.  
 So in the distinction between modern Erlebnis and pre-modern Erfahrung borrowed in 
part from Dilthey, Benjamin, and Gadamer, Erlebnis is conceptualized as fundamentally 
alienated, even at odds with, tradition and history. A useful illustration of the difference might be 
found in a gloss of Gadamer’s take on Hegel’s famous pronouncement from his Lectures on 
Aesthetics: “art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past” (11). 
For Hegel, art has ended in the romantic (i.e. Christian) era precisely because in that era art 
becomes entirely the province of experience as Erlebnis. The experience of art under the regime 
of Erlebnis becomes aesthetic in the contemporary sense in that it loses what Benjamin called its 
content—content that was available to us in the regime of Ehfarung—and replaces it with 
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entirely personal, subjective, ahistorical, private and essentially incommunicable “experience.” 
According to Hegel—for whom art was merely a step along with religion to the supreme 
knowledge granted Absolute Idealist philosophy—and to Gadamer, it is this subjectivist 
understanding of art upon which we operate today. It is in contrast to what Hegel calls classical 
art, the art of the Greeks, which he considers to be the highest form of art because it retains 
“content” therefore allowing for Erfahrung. That is, the experience of art enjoyed, supposedly, 
by the Greeks was one in which art was not cleaved off from spirit, society, tradition, and 
history.18 One did not go to a museum, look at an artwork, and have an experience (Erlebnis). 
Instead, the experience of art was always already communal and, following Charles Taylor, we 
might say embedded in society, history, religion: in culture. So although Benjamin and Gadamer 
draw very different conclusions from the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung they inherit 
from Dilthey, they fundamentally agree both on the nature of the difference and on its relevance 
to the analysis of art and culture.19  
 I contend that the experience of brutality found in Breaking Bad, an experience that I 
consider to be singularly analogous to the initiate’s experience of death metal, demonstrates that 
the distinctions Gadamer and Benjamin see between Erfahrung and Erlebnis is deceptive. What 
Benjamin calls the shock that disintegrates the aura of the artwork, and which is illustrative of 
the general character of the individual’s experience of modernity, can be understood to be the 
shock of the new.20 In his analysis, and to a certain degree in Gadamer’s, that shock of the new 
isolates the individual’s experience (Erlebnis) from its previous historical and traditional cultural 
context (Erfahrung). What is fascinating about the experience of brutality is that it is one of 
“shock,” as I have noted above, but in a different way than the shock of the new. That is, the 
brutality Breaking Bad is—like that of death metal—shocking in a disruptive way, but only at 
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first. As the viewer is initiated into the logic of the program and this happens quickly for the 
reasons we have seen above, as she attunes herself to the show’s tangential relation to the real 
world, as she becomes aware that nothing good will or even can come about in this particular 
fictional world, she comes to expect and even perversely anticipate the next terrible event or 
outcome. The viewer is not shocked by the new, but she is “shocked,” and the scare quotes are 
vital here, by how events play out. She is likely to mutter to herself something to the effect of 
“My god, I can’t believe he/she/they/the show did that!” but she does so in full awareness that 
although the specific resolution is not necessarily predictable except in its awfulness (say Jesse’s 
murder of the hapless Gale in season three’s finale “Full Measure” or Hank’s death in 
“Ozymandius”), she does know that things will end poorly. And it is this fact that allows her to 
savor the deliciousness of the horrific even as the dread of it all oppresses her. As I have argued 
it, the complex interweaving of comforting dread and anticipated “shock” that simultaneously 
produces a strange connoisseurship of the dreadful anticipation itself and of the terrible event is 
the defining factor of the experience of brutality. That experience is at the heart of Breaking Bad 
and it is possible only through the viewer’s familiarity with its inexorably brutal logic. But as 
seen above, she first must first be familiar with the generic conventions of prestige television, 
and of American television more broadly speaking. She has to know what to expect and how to 
process what comes. This generic knowledge, both of television in general and specifically of 
Breaking Bad, is nothing other than Ehfarung. That is, it is not a private, isolated moment of 
experience. Instead it is a shared awareness of the history and tradition, if you will, of American 
television and of Breaking Bad’s own internal logic of brutality. Without both, the essential 
quality of the show, its dynamis—the experience of brutality—cannot be produced.  
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In fact, it is only with this situated Ehfarung that the experience of Erlebnis, the “shock” 
that the show relies on, even becomes possible. The point then is that the depth of that aesthetic 
experience of “shock” simply cannot be exhausted by calling it Erlebnis, for it is simultaneously 
private and communally situated. It is private in the sense that the experience of brutality is 
fundamentally an aesthetic, and thus subjective, one very much in the neo-Kantian sense that 
Gadamer critiques. It is also crucially communal though in the sense that in order to have this 
experience at all, the viewer must take part in a particular aspect of the project of human culture 
whether she is aware of it or not. The apparent Erlebnis of viewer “shock” in Breaking Bad then 
is at the same time ahistorical and deeply historical. As Erlebnis, it is momentary; a passing inner 
state that gives us no real knowledge and that is un-situated, if not untimely. At the same time 
this “shock” is historical for the simple reason that it requires of the view an attunement to 
generic precedent, to the duration of genre if you will. In the case of the experience of brutality 
found in Breaking Bad, then, communal Ehfarung serves as the ground for subjective Erlebnis. 
This is true of death metal as well, but because of death metal’s intentional marginality, it 
remains essentially un-theorized. By taking this centrally aesthetic experience of brutality and 
making it accessible while at the same time maintaining its disruptive power, Breaking Bad 
allows us to think the aesthetic differently, to think the character of brutality in the present sense 
differently, and to think both death metal and Gilligan’s series more rigorously. 
The experience of brutality as we have seen it would appear, on a Gadamerian analysis, 
at first blush to be the worst kind of subjective aestheticism. This is because it relies on personal 
sensation, the sensation of delicious “shock.” To Benjamin, perhaps, this “shock” can be a 
disruptive and destructive break from tradition, something like the Messianic power of his angel 
of history (“Theses on the Philosophy of History” IX). But the experience of brutality shows that 
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at least in some cases defining experience in terms of discrete Ehfarung or Erlebnis is 
problematic. While we can certainly experience the pure, private Erlebnis of Benjamin’s shock, 
and while the communal hermeneutic tradition of Ehfarung persists in religion, law, and 
humanistic study, what Gadamer fails to see and what Benjamin says only occurs in Baudelaire’s 
Les Fleurs du mal—nothing less than a transubstantiation of Erlebnis into Ehfarung—is itself 
the dynamis of the experience of brutality. Thus to the extent that Breaking Bad is synonymous 
with the experience of brutality, it demonstrated that the circle of Erlebnis and Ehfarung can be 
squared, in both theory and practice. As the death metal of television, far more so than 
Metalocalypse, Breaking Bad illuminates the fairly radical notion that the subjectivist structure 
of modern aesthetic experience sometimes called Erlebnis in the Continental tradition is 
rooted—perhaps paradoxically—in what is understood as its precursor and opposite, communal 
Ehfarung. When we look closely at the experience of brutality then, something that the present 
analysis of Breaking Bad has allowed us to do, we find that it has important things to teach us 
about what literary critic Paul de Man considered the paradigmatic ideological construction, the 
aesthetic. 
I am grateful to the following for their assistance with various versions of this essay.  
Without the initial guidance of John H. Smith and a stimulating exchange with Philip Walsh, it 
would not exist at all. Without the careful eyes and thoughtful suggestions of Beverly Andrews, 
Shane Billings, and Beverly Tjerngren whatever clarity it now has would not have come to be. 
 
                                                
1 In fact an article at the influential popular arts and culture website The A.V. Club entitled “The golden age of TV is 
dead; long live the golden age of TV” features as its lead-in image a still of Breaking Bad’s Walter White.  
2 Szalay advises us to remember “Norman Lear, Aaron Spelling, Steven Bochco, Chris Carter, Aaron Sorkin, and 
many others” (111). 
3 I have reservations about this position based in part on the tendency The Wire has to rely on realist tropes that 
serve to obscure the artifice of the series.  
5 The scene also includes a veiled reference to a modern master of horror-suspense, and a clear influence on 
Gilligan, John Carpenter (Assault on Precinct 13, Halloween). Saul’s shell corporation, to which Badger’s payment 
is to be made, is called Ice Station Zebra. The name comes from the title of a 1968 film starring Rock Hudson that 
Carpenter is an avowed fan of (Lang), and that plays a small role in Carpenter’s made for television biopic Elvis 
(Williams 121). 
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7 See Andrzej Warminski’s “The Future Past of Literary Theory” for an in-depth discussion of dynamis in 
Aristotle’s theory of tragedy. 
8 Although in the present analysis we are concerned with Gilligan’s intent regarding the aesthetic experience the 
series produces, we do not actually need an account of intent that goes beyond that of creating art for the present 
definition of “aesthetic” to function. The question of intent in art is a tricky one, of course, but I think in this case we 
are on solid ground when we note the intentionality in the specific case of Breaking Bad.  
9 Nussbaum writes in “That Mind-Bending Phone Call on Last Night’s ‘Breaking Bad’” that “if you ignore the dead 
kids, son, you are watching ‘Breaking Bad’ wrong.” This is an untenable position in light of the series finale.  
10 As even the most cursory glance shows heavy metal—like its relative hardcore punk—is an almost absurdly 
variegated genre. The list of “extreme” subgenres provided here represents only a very small number of subgenres. 
And even death metal itself is subdivided into different types by style (melodic death metal [aka melodo-death], 
technical death metal, brutal death metal) and by origin of location (Swedish death metal, Florida death metal, etc.). 
The reasons for this almost pathological subcategorization within heavy metal are too complex to address at present, 
but the phenomenon is fascinating indeed. 
11 “Thrash engendered a variety of ever more radical extreme metal genres…. [b]ands such as Death and Possessed 
created death metal out of thrash metal. Vocals became less and less intelligible, songwriting became more complex 
and guitar ‘riffs’… sounded increasingly… dark” (Kahn-Harris Extreme Metal: Music and Culture on the Edge 3). 
12 If our hypothetical fan experienced none of the oppressive and grueling aspects of death metal, she would have no 
reason to listen to it. 
13 Philosopher David Vessey offers a useful discussion of the two words and their respective associations: 
Erlebnis is constructed from leben, to live, and refers to subjective, first-hand experiences. (In English we 
have a way of talking that parallels the German; consider the sentence "To understand something you need 
to live it.") It is this subset of experiences that Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey saw as a possible source for 
philosophical foundations. Erfahrung refers to that subset of experience that connects directly to judgment; 
it is often inferred, need not be first-person, and emphasizes cognitive insights. Erfahrung is constructed 
from fahren, to travel, as the realizations in the experiences move and transform one. It is the correlate for 
the English word empirical, as in the empirical sciences (Erfahrungswissenschaft) and being experienced 
(erfahrend). (3-4) 
14 Dilthey’s primary intellectual project was a theoretical account of the human sciences and perhaps his greatest 
contribution to such an account was arguably the notion that human life, i.e. lived experience, exists in a way that 
Heidegger would later call “always-already” within interpretive cultural and historical contexts. 
15 “Das könnte sein, weil sich deren Erfahrung in ihrer Struktur verändert hat” 
16 In that seminal essay Benjamin writes  
Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and 
space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art 
determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence. This includes the 
changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the various changes in 
its ownership….The situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not 
touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated. This holds not only for 
the art work but also, for instance, for a landscape which passes in review before the spectator in a movie. 
In the case of the art object, a most sensitive nucleus – namely, its authenticity – is interfered with whereas 
no natural object is vulnerable on that score. The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is 
transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which 
it has experienced. Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by 
reproduction when substantive duration ceases to matter. And what is really jeopardized when the historical 
testimony is affected is the authority of the object.  
 
One might subsume the eliminated element in the term “aura” and go on to say: that which withers in the 
age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose 
significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. (220-221) 
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17 It is crucial to note that for Gadamer “prejudice” cannot and should not be avoided. In terms of what we have 
seen of Dilthey, we might say that Gadamer’s prejudice is a central part of the lifeworld. 
18 Although Heidegger does not notably engage with the Erlebnis and Ehfarung distinction, his well-known 
discussion of the Greek temple in “The Origin of the Work of Art” is an excellent example of an analogous analysis. 
19 Benjamin sees a certain radical, perhaps even violently disruptive, potential for liberation here when he writes of 
“the disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock” (“Motifs” 194).  In contrast, in Truth and Method, 
Gadamer advocates for a rejection of what can be called the ideology of Erlebnis in favor of an acknowledgement of 
the crucial meaning making of a hermeneutic approach that acknowledges tradition, history, and positive prejudice, 
i.e. Erfahrung. 
20 Benjamin’s analyses in The Arcades Project, and in various essays available elsewhere, of the collector, the 
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